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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

'·I I

.·•1111-'i.
_1n·l

r)·;

r;u~11··11

J'1H:i

'I l
'·1J

,J1_'·~~·J

PAYNE,

Pf,TRI·~K

thr0uqh his
in arl r,item,
.~'l•'.EL
'!~l'..

,;·~··rHAiHE

Pl1'i'lF:,

EL PAYNE,

and

PAY~E,

Pla1ntiff~-Appellants
"J

s.

No.

19218

'• .'v1YSRS, ~.O.;
P. KESLER, M.D.;

1 -;r~?'rH

,JCoSFP'i

r1n ST,\T,; OF l'TAH M'D
'1'-':f'll''·PPf::D CHILDREN'S
~1.rv1cr; and THE DIVISION
11' 1JEALT 11 OF TllE STATE OF

'IT.\H,
nPfendant~-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
GARTH MYERS, M.D.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants John M.

Payne and Stephanie Payne have

r.r. :il.r. .1n act ion for neol igent wrongful birth and Appellant
•3•·1 "

"!1

Pa>'n",

c.r ... 1.111'..

t'1rough his father and Guardian ad Litem, John

1n action for wrongful life against Respondents

··1 ···rs, M.D., ,Joseph P. Kesler,

M.D., The State of Utah

1... •"l"'d 1'hil•lren's Service; and the Division of Health of the
1

,, '

1! 1

·it
11'

'Jt

c'1.

i•1ns that

l\n::i(•llants'

claims for damages are based on the

t'1ey concei•1ed and gave birth to their son,

Michael P. Payne,

relying on the ad·1ice and as:;.Jran''" .,~ ;.,.

dents Kesler and Myers that "his child c0uld he :,,,rn '1tr·,.,
of defect or

impair~ent.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Motions for summary judgment ty all resoonder.ts wero
considered by the district court.

The rrot ion for srrnmar,

judgment by responnents Myers and t\esler was oranted as to ,,
claims by all appellants on the basis of Utah Code Annotate1
§63-30-4

(1978).

Summary judgments were also enter»d

in

fav,Jc

the State of Utah Handicapped Children's Services and the
Division of Health of the State of Utah against cippellants Jo".:
M.

Payne and Stephanie Payne on the orounds that thev ,ilJ not

timely serve notice of claim against the State of Utah respon,
dents pursuant to Utah Corle Annotated §63-30-12.

The moti,)n ":

summary judgment by the State of Utah responnents as to the c·'.
of Michael P.

Payne was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Responnents ask this Court to affirm the order or

H

District Court grant1nq respondents MyPr~'and Keslers' mot1oc
summary judgment as to all claims bv all

-2-

appDllrin~~-

0

STATEMENT OF FACTS
0n September 2,

John and Stephanie Payne.

·~:0ll•nts

Within a few months after

i1i:·tlc, the appellants detected physical ailments in the

tl1P

::Iii

1975, Matthew Payne was born to

Matth"'w Payne was subsequently examined by both Dr. Myers

l·~.

dn~

Kesl.,r. No specific determination of the ailment was

~r.

:r1de.
In 1977, John and Stephanie Payne discussed the
c,:"" 1hi1 it'/ of a second pregnancy with respondents Dr. Kesler and
Dr. M·;ers.

The aopellants expressed concern that their son
disabilities might be related to a genetic disorder. In

~3tthew's

the fall of

1977, the respondents arranged an appointment for the

ar?"'llants to meet with Dr. Robert Fineman, a doctor with
expertise in genetic counseling.

This appointment, however, was

ap,,c,rencly cancelled and never rescheduled.
On February 14,

1978, Mrs. Payne visited her obstet-

r1c1an gynecologist, Dr. R. Kent Gibbs.
removed

Payne's intra-uterine birth control device (IUD).

Depa p.

:r~irihs
110

~rs.

r r11u,

Mrs.

20).

For at least a month after the removal of

Payne 11sed a contraceptive foam to prevent preg-

(<;ibbs Depa pp.

n.1n~·,.

At that time, Dr. Gibbs

21

&

52).

Mrs. Payne's last recorded menstrual period was May 2,
I'•

1:rk
1 'l

''"'

1c;i1Jbs Depa p.

)-i,

I

!1 j

, 1,1ve
-~

~a"''

22; Tr. p.

10).

On January 27,

1979, Mrs.

birt'1 to her second son, Michael P. Payne, appellant

l'3S~.

Soon after birth, Michael Payne began to develop

impair'llents which had appeared in his brother. An

-3-

examination by

gpnnticist

3

s'='v.<?ral

;r;nnt·i~

birth resulted in a proba1,1e dia<in<Y;is of
disease,

1980,

1f1_-'-r·- ·ii

Pl i"..1Pu::-·,,,, . 11

a hereditarv, procire"'i·1n brain 'li·"orrl'°r.

and filecl their

cor~olaint

in

r'~i·;

1cti•)n

The comrlaint all1>qed only nealiqence against
and Kesler.

)n ilr<ril 'J,
rr>;Don I·· 1'ec ·!·

The trial court ,lrantPd LPsrondents ,...,,/Pr.-3' dn

Keslers'

motion for summary

§63-30-4

( 1978). The statuto preclurios pe>rsonal

government employee for

JUcla11C''lt

bas1'd ,)n ·it ah r'ocl» '.nn
liahi

1•

ne::

30,

19'\.

fraud or malice.
Section 63-30-4 became effecti·ve on

This was clearlv before '1rs.
trial court '1elcl,
wronqful birth)

Payne became preqnant and, a;

coulcl have

appellant, Michael P.
Respondent;
effect he fore an·,' anrJ

the statute came into effect befoc 0

(C:ee Tr.

Payne.
take

~rongcul

p.

40,

l.

1-11.J

111 causes of act ion for neql l<Jr>n.:"

statute preclurles su1;::. aria inst_
of

life on hen~lf of

the position that §63-20-4 was in

the respondents arose on heh alt

i0ns

I'

3risen on benalf of the µar0n••. '

cause of action had arisen ~or

al l~qat

·~arc!1

be for<" anv ca:1se of act ion for neql 1~PnCP '~

the parties agreed that

absent

o'.

111·.1

the nF>aliqent performance of 'ii·· rl.1'1 ..

unless the employee actF>ri or fai lF>ri to ctct throCJqh qr
gence,

,,

frat1c1,

of

thP a.·oel lantc. . rn·i r'1·1 1·

inrii'Jl.'i Jal

qov.-~rnrn1--?n ... 1~

<1L'lSS ni:->·ll l ~""'ncr-~ or

-4-

Tldl i,·i.J

3nci''
'

l'.;Sr>rts that
.,1

§63-30-4

is constitutional and that the

the trial court should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
POHlT

I

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-30-4 (1975) PRECLUDES
Pl-'!lSmJA.L Lll\BILITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE FOR
l\r'T OR OMISSI•)N OCCURING DURING PERFORMANCE
i)F HIS DUTIES UNLESS THE ACT WAS DUE TO GROSS
NEGLIG~NCE,
fqAUD OR MALICE.

The appellants filed an action alleging only negligence
a~:ci1n,t

r: er" ic;

rC'spondents Kesler and Myers in their personal capacity.
w)

disoute that responnents Kesler and Myers were

·'1"pl•Y1cc"":; of the Stcite of Utah actinq within the scope of their
E11•:il·Y/'1l'cr1t.
~~i-in-1

r SeP

Plaintiffs complaint,

1123).

Utah Code Ann.

as cimended in 1978, provides:
Noth1na contained in this act unless
sp~cificallv orovided is to be construed as
an omission or denial of liability or
n1sability insofar as governmental entities
are concernen.
Wherein immunity from suit is
waived bv this act, consent to be sued is
qranted and liability of the entity shall be
determined as if the entity were a private
per-son.

The remedv aqainst a governmental entity or
its employees for an injury caused by an act
or omission which occurs during the
performance of such employees duties, within
the scone of emolovment, or under color of
d11thorit·1 is, afte~ the effective date of
t '1 i:; aet·, exclusive of any other civil act or
l'C•)C'."'ding by reason of the same subject
matter •qainst the employee or the estate of
th0 emplovee, whose act or omission gave
ad•1ice to the claim, unless the employee
a··te<l or failed to act through gross
11e·1ligence, fraud or malice.

-5-

An employee mav he joinPd in an action
against a gavPrnrnental Pntit; in a
representative capaci•v if the act or
omission complained ,)c ls onP in 'which u,,-governmental Antity may be liable, but n•)
employee shall be helcl "''rsocial 1'1 l i,;;,1' ',
acts or omissions occurlna durin~ the
perfocmance of the emplo,1ees duties, wir 1i 11
the scope of employment or under color of
authority, unless it is established that rhe
employee acted or failed to act due to arnss
negligence, fraud or 1lalice.
The amended statute became effective on
It is the resnondent Mver's position that §63-30-4

c'lar,~ 1 ,

c]PJ-!~

preclLides appellants from hrinqin-1 a nealigence action
respondents Kesler and

~yers

in their personal

1"l, 1c-

a.c31 1 ;:

capacit~

Court has analyzed this specific issue in the recent ca3e
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
personal liability of government employees,

except

a:~

a11t,v1ri.

mental immunit1 act.

~Ad

in

the court

~h~

nov??rn-

The seconc1 y110t-ecl oara,1raoh ot )63-30-4
reaffirms tn,1t c:ie 0rnol<)v0e ·,.;111 not he
personall'! liac)le unl, ss he or ;he a.~t-_Pd '"
failed to act duP to qross nealioenc"', fr311.i
or 11alicP.
[65R P.2d at ~~3 tfootnot ·
omitted, ernpha:~i:o adcled)].
0

-fi-

~'

In as:...,ess i nJ
~tat- 0 l:

The 1978 amendment to the Governmental
Immunity Act, in §63-30-4, establishes a new
statLJtory standard for official immunity.
Thus, under the first quoted paragraph, the
act's expansion of the right to sue governmental entities and its permission to su~
governmental employees for "gross nealigence,
fraud, or malice" is declared to be "exclusive of any other civil action or proccedinq
bv reason of the sarne subject matter aaainst
t~e employee or the estate of the employee.
•
By this provision, ~63-30-4 precludes
all statutorv or c.immon la'" causes of act1nn
against an e~plovee in his or her personal
capacity for acts or omissions whic>-i oc•~''ir
dur1na the performance of the employees'

duties,

r• 1 ,

Thus,
,,,,,] in

it is clear that if the provisions of §63-30-4 as

1978, are applicable to the facts in this case, the

n ~,111 111~ <>f

the motion for summary judqment in favor of respon-

.1. nt; Kesl·•r and 'lyers was proper.
L:c>t

th,c1 r

,,f

cause of action arose prior to the date §63-30-4

effective.

1~c•me

act

i.1n

Appellants argue, however,

As will be set forth below, appellants' cause

did not arise until after March 30,

1978, and is

suh]ect •o the provisions of the statute. Respondents Kesler and
cannot he sued in their personal capacity because §63-30-4

~yers

precludes personal

liability of government employees for acts or

omissions occurinq durinq the performance of their duties, unless
the employees "acted or failed to act, throuqh gross neqligence,
fraud or malice." Since plaintiffs' complaint makes no such
Allegation,
Kesl~r

the granting of summary judgment as to respondents

and Myers was proper.

POINT II
APPELLANTS' CLAIMS AGAINST RESPONDENTS DID
NOT ARISE UNTIL AFTER §63-30-4 BECAME
EFFECTIVE AND, THEREFORE, ARE BARRED BY THE
STATUTE.
A. All the Elements of a Negliqence Action
Must Exist Before a Cause of Action Can Arise.
The elements of actionable negligence are:
L•

h\' one person to another,

t «

{!
"l•"•n""'

11,><lti

1'"~"

( 2)

( 1)

a breach of th at duty,

damaq•• proximately resulting from such breach.
rnllst

A legal

All the

co-exist before there can be any recovery.

,_ r'3rson, 519 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex.Civ.App. 1975);
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Hunter v. Knioht,
215 ( 1977)

Vale <. (;u•oor?,

18 i·iash.:\pp. 64n,

(negliqence action arises when all

Plement~

to maintenance of a law suit are present.)
v. Cokayne,

646 P.2d 747

v. Wasatch Gradino Co.,
Thus,

(Utah

19S2);

14 P. 2d 98H,

the q en er a 1 r u 1 e

sustained injury,

ther~

Industrial <on1m'n of·;.
992-993,

is no cause of action for a claim
See P.g.

561, 564 (N.D.Ill.

(under Illinois law,

1981)

Bonano v.

D0tthoff, S:' 1.c

for neq 1 igence unt i 1 t'ie inJ ury or damage has

&

Sur.

Co.,

Royal Crown flottlinq,

438 F.Su::or.

193~;.

is that u n 1 es s the o 1 a i n • 1 ' '

sounding in negligence.

malpractice acti)n);

(Utah

39,

44-45

('"l.D.Okl.

no cause ot

3 :·

occurrerl-atto~o·

Etc. v. l\etna
197'7)

··3,

inle ir

Oklahoma is that a negligence action may not he maintained
and until the plaintiff has sustained in1ury,
an essential element of the claim");
257,

259

(Colo.App.

1975)

Doyle v.

(without damage,

y.

because "inJ"
Lynn,

547 P.2ri

there is no caus1•

action on claim based on negligence; Romano v. Westinqhnuse
Co.,

336 A.2d 555, 559 (R.I.

1975)

(proof of actual damages

i·

essential part of plainti~f's case and negligence action); :r.
Paul Mueller Co. •r. Cache '!alley Dairy Ass 'n,
(Utah

657 P. 2d 127Y,

1982).
General principles which ordinarily govern in n°1'

gence also apply in medical malpractice cases.
36 Md.App.

633,

375 A.:'d

1138,

1147 (1977).

Thus,

to pr

case in medical malpractice the plaintiff has the ourden o~
proving that the r:ihysician was n'"'liqent

-8-

in fai linq tn

·ice

, ,,

care> ancl that the failure to use ordinary care was the

•. ,,,. c·ause of plaintiff's injury.
id'"'"' 401,
'.4d,

'lS4

S99 P.2d 292,

Conrad v. St. Clair,

100

295 (1979); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d

('Jtah 1980).
It

is the apoellants' contention that their claim and

'r"· n"'ol i•1P11ce hcid fully matured prior to March 30, 1978, the date
amP~ied

~~!-10-4

rli·~1Jutr:

t-!11'.~

became effective.

assertion.

The respondents vigorously

The respondents recognize that if a

phj"'1cian-patient relationship existed between Mrs. Payne and
Or-:.

Keslcer and :·1:,ors, then a duty existed.

al~o

acknowledge,

Respondents will

for the sake of argument, that if their action

rell below the standard of care exercised by physicians of
similar training in similar locals, there may be a breach of the
J.t; owced to Mrs.

Payne.

The respondents, however, contend

u1wqui•1ocallv that whatever

injur~·

was sustained by the alleged

breach of the duty owned to Mrs. Payne did not occur until Mrs.
hecamt> preonant,

Pa·,11e

a time clearly after March 30, 1978.

B. Claims of Any Appellant Against Respondents Kesler and Myers D1d Not Arise
Until Mrs. Payne Became Pregnant.
All the parties agree the statute became effective
hc>I "' c

i

ea,1se of action accruea on behalf of the appellant,

I P.1yn•'·

·'t

'""-·
i•, ..

~r~.

(See Tr. p.

that John and

40, 1. 1-13.)

St~phanie

The appellants argue,

Payne, acting in reliance on the

,,.,1 ne'lliqent advise of respondents Kesler and Myers, had
Pavne's IUD removed, ana,

•·xp<'nS"".

thus incurred some medical

The ap:i<>l lants assert that this expense constituted an
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"injury" which gave rise to their claim againo~t.
As a matter of law,

this cont>'ntion is

As was noted above,

th» ,- .... :i, 1 nd"·

incorrect.

the general rrinciples ,,,, 1 ,·;·

ordinarily govern in negligence actions also appl~ in ~ 0 ~i:·
malpractice cases.

Riffey v.

Conder,

sun L~; Nixdorf v. fi 1 -

A brief review of the case law and legal commentar;
dealing with the accrual of a neali·1enr"
demonstrate that the so-c.1llerl injury,

by the aprel lanls ·,1as

sufficient to sustain a cause of action for
is "wrongful birth" which

"wronc1ful

birt~.·

is John and Stephanie Payne's cau;"

action against the respondents,
the child's claim for

of act ion wi:'

1~ause

and is the parents equival•1

"wrongfJl life."

See general lC', Rodoer'

Wrongful Life and Wronqf•-11 Girth: Medical r1alpractic" in Gece•
Counseling and Pre-Natal Testina,

33 S.C.L.R.ev.

713

(198:'1.

Sorr.e medical rnalpract ice cases hold that a c1qse of
action arises when an inJur1 is sustained by the plaintiff,
when the causes are set

(1959)

6 8 A • 2d 5 1 7

'J.

Morgan,

(citing Foley

·1.

Pittshurg Des Moines Co.,

( 19 49 ) ) •

"The injury

397 Pa.

pro<luc~ 1°·

Ayers

as a consequence.
790

in motion which ultimately

It is

Ayers v.

'1oraan,

154 A.2d 780,
3~3 ?J.

is done when the act heralcr·

a possible tort inflicts dcirnaqe which
ascertainable."

282,

is physic.1lly obiecu·;e

s•JDra at 792.

impor·tant to not" t'1at the mere L1ct .1 •.111ysic 1

is mistaken in a <liaonosis is nnt sufficient,

standin,1 ~11(

warrant a findina of negligence.
579,

586

(N.D.

n~·

1979); 1orne v.

Rrumfir>lrl,

-10-

'lfl3 So.2'1 7g, Rl

11

''

Rather,
1

I

1

"1

wrw" will

not of itself support a malpractice action.

laintiff must also show that such negligence was a proximate

c", "c
,~ir.

"[c]onclusive proof of a doctor's

1)f

the injury."

Voeqeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 94 (8th

1977).
T~us,

It

no medical malpractice action arises until injury
is at this point that a plaintiff's cause of

action is complete and legally cognizable.
n,~1

"Where a physician

l iqent ly diagnosis a case, he is not liable unless injury

follows as a result of such negligence."
Bank v.

Rankin,

367 P.2d 835, 840 (Wash.

Seattle-First National
1962).

Case law from the area of legal malpractice is also
instri1cti•;e.
3 l'-lu.n.

In Veseley Otto Miller' Keefe v. Blake, 311 NW.2d

1981),

a lawyer sought contribution from a doctor after

thP lawyer had been found
~·l•Jicc~
aq1in~t

liable for malpractice for failing to

a client about the two-year statute of limitations claim
the noctor.

tribution,

In denying the lawyer's claim for con-

the court stated:
When Dr. Blake allegedly treated John
Togstean in a negligent manner, Todstead
could have sued him for damaqes for personal
injuries arising from medical malpractice at
that time and throughout the two-year statute
of limitations.
However, the Togsteads could
not have sued appellants for negligent legal
advice during this two-year period because at
•his point they had suffered no damage
arisina from the legal malpractice.
The
Taqstean's ability to appellants for damages
arose only at the time, and indeed for the
very reason, that thev could no longer sue
Dr. Rlake, i.e. at the expiration of a
limitations for the medical malpractice
c\.1im. [311 NW.2d at 5].
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Similarl/,
604

(!linn.

1982),

in RC>li3nce In.

the Mi'.1nesota Supreme Co11rc

lawyer was not ne9ligent .1s a rnatter nf

'1el'1 ,, .. -

law for mal;iract 1,.

his acts or omissions resulted in dama-1c t0
of the expiration of the Statute 0f

~ua1n

cl1c>nt, bee.;,

111s

~imit3ci1ns.

that damage is an essential Plement of a negligence causP n'
action,

and that "the threat of future harm,

will not satisf/ the damage requirement."
Thus,

the clieni: 's right

not yet realizea,

322 NA. 2d at iiU7.

to sue f.1n legal malpractice does r.

accrue when the client incurs a financial obligation to the
lawyer,

but only when the final act directly leading t0 the

actual damage is consummated.
A sirnilar line of

Bonanno v.
case,

Potthoff,

reasoning was appliec:l hy the cour

527 !7.Supp.

('J.D.Ill.

561

19811.

a client brought a malpractice action against his attor--

after the attorney

negl~gently

failed

to file his ap1karcne

A subsequent

litigation broughc by the client.

action

0

file~

identical grounds to those 0f the original action was also
dismissed on a res

judicata decision.

The court held that

plaintiff's cause of action dU1 not ari"e until the secund •' 1
was dismissed by the ·rial court and this dismissal was up" 0
the appellate court. The court stated:
analysis

"Inrleed,

tfie foree

'.-

01

is supported by case law indicatinq t11at 2-2111

against Pott'.1off before the ao1Jellate crn1rt ,Jeci·;1on ni,1~:

have been
added l.

dis~isse~

as

pr~rn3turP.

See also Walk~r v.

11

527

F'.Supp.

Pacific Ind0m.

-1 2-

Co.,

at

Sfi5

(e'11PC1J

6 Cal.Rptr.

,.,,,

<'cil.App.2d 513, 517 (1960)

IH'

.-11m,v1P

111'1

(probability that event

will result from wrongful act does not render act

The appellants, therefore, could not have brought a
birth action when they allegeclly received assurances

·.vr .. nc1ful

thP resonndents that a second child would be healthy.

f•
'01lld

Nor

apf)Pllants hav<" brought suit for wrongful birth when they

io_-.ir•P·l the nnminal cost of

the office visit to Dr. Gibbs. A

suit tor wronuful birth, at that time, would clearly have been
As the court succinctly states in Alhino v. Starr,

prEmaturP.

169 Cal.Rpt.

136, 147, 112 Cal.App.3d 158, 176 (1980):

If the allegedly negligent conduct cloes not
cause damage, it generates no cause of action
and tort. The mere breach of a professional
duty, causing only nominal damages,
speculative harm-not yet realized-does not
suffice or create a cause of action for
ne1liqence.
Even supposing that the office visit of Mrs. Payne to
Dr.

~1rns

1n February of 1973 is cognizable as an injury to the

appellants, when viewed in the context of a negligence claim for
,;r1)n·1ful birth this would be "nominal damages, speculative
~1 Li

yet rea 1 i zed.

r ,n-nut

3I

is not sufficient to support a nealigence action for

,,,~

hirth. See Repp v. Bahn, 45 Or.App. 671, 609 P.2d 398,

'11
"'':'- lU I

,.,-,

Such a claim of injury, standing

( 1 ~80)

I .1f

(doctors' erroneous diagnosis of scalp condition,

·'r J ,,,J to cancer, was not act ionahle harm at time of
It is only at the time when Mrs. Payne becomes

c:ir

10

·111.,-11

ti1.1t a cause of action possibly begins to arise.
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Indeeci,

given the fact

that

~hP di.::~asc

Payne suffers from only ncc1rs

in ;r..Jle.c,

in time durin·1 the pregnanc'/ in which

that
it

1nrcl l

3n1

"1i

is arqtJahb?

1t h'Ould

be

1-.,-

1

90ssi:-,1rl

determine the sex of the chi lrl ,'.Jr e'Jen if tne child was
from th 0
1979)

disease.

Cf.

Foil v. Rallina"r, 601 P.2rl 144

3 ,,,,,_

1''• 0 •

(statute of limitations of Healt1 Care '1alpractice

Ac•

begins to run when inj•Jred (Jerson knows or sho•.ilcl knoi; t'1''
has suffered leaal injury).
The question is when clo the plaintiffs have a Je1al_
cognizable claim for an action for wrongful birth.

The ans·...·.:

they did not have a legally cognizable claim at anv time µr
t(,e conception of "1ichael Payne, which was clearly after 'f·-'
became effective.
(4th Ed.

W.

Prosser, The Law of Torts S30, pp.

1;:_,

1971), agrees with this conclusion:
Since the action for negligence developerl
chieflv out of the olJ forms of action on the
case, it retained the rule of that action,
that proof of damage was an essential part of
the plaintiffs' case. Nominal damages, to
indicate a technical r1aht, cannot he
recovered in a neulia 0 nce action where no
actual loss has occurrerl. The tnreat of
future har:n, not yet realized, is not eno11qh.
Negligent conduct in itself is not such an
interference with the intcr<0st ,,f the world
at larqe that there is an/ rinht to comrl~in
of it .
The record

i~

clear that

period was in "lay of 1978.
date when

§~3-30-4

~rs.

(S<ee Tr. p.

became effective.

-1 4-

Payne's last rnens 1 c
10).

Th is '..Ja::_;

al ro:

Th"' Payne's action for wrongful birth,
d1·1 n<)t
time

sounding in

3rise until '1rs. Pavne became pregnant, well

§~3-30-4

became operative.

A claim for wronaf ul

' ' l l If;

r1or to this time would have been premature. The appel-

.. 1

"in J llr ices," the supposed charge for removal of Mrs.
ir1'),

'cJ\'ne:>''~

is not even listed in Dr. Gibbs'

financial account

(See Gibbs Depo, Exhibit "A").

The

_I ,,q.c --

l 1 ;tprl for

1978 are for a pap smear and a routine office

"t•;it.

Th0rc' is no charae for the removal of the IUD. The

<•r eo-1nan-·v is charged in one lu11p sum on January 28,
.J•n· :nt

.,,- S q5. 00.

"inJ•ir::"

(See Gibbs Depo, Exhibit "A"). Thus,

if the

is the financial obligation incurred from the removal of

11 1 0,

r_l;e

1979, in the

it

is arguable they suffered no injury until the

'' l 11-1t i•'n ari11eared in the financial statement of Dr. Gibbs in
I 'J~ 9.

Conceding, however,
f ,-,,,n

""'''-

for the sake of argument, that the

the removal of the IUD was a separate charge that was

incurred by the plaintiffs at the time of the February,
··f"i·'~

'"

'li;it to Dr. Gibbs,

1978

the issue of whether a cause of action

·..i1·1rnq•u1 birth had arisen can be resolved only one way:

"''•

,o-•

i·•n ·,;as sustainable at that time.

No

The appellants, having

time prior to Mrs. Payne's becoming preanant, would
11
•

t

i

1
-

3! --~'I.

1

.ont it: led to recover only nominal damages-an indication

1ni,'-1l right which cannot be recovered in a negligence

'Wh"r"

nu actual

1·'LitH,,

harm is incurred.

Limit3t-ions on Actions 11
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Prosser, supra.
(1959).

See

Section 63-30-4

;:ir,~clu::les

p,orsonal

liah1 l

ir~r

fr,.

government employc>es unless they act or fai 1 to act r!1r'"''"'
neoligence,

fraud or malice,

an:i beca:ne effrocr ive 'larc·r 'i,,

The plaintiffs filer'l an action alle>qinq only neql iqence
respondents Kesler ancl Myers

d'!.i,·

in their [>ersonal capacity.

Th'

plaintiffs cause of action [or wronqful birth accrried onb r
time Mrs.
early May,

Payne became pregnant,
1978.

sometime at the end of Apri:

Section 63-30-4 thus precludes any cause of

action aqainst respondents Kesler and Myers and the qrant1no
summary judgment as to those respondents was proper.

POINT III
WRITING REQUIRSD AS BASIS FOR LIARILITY
FOR BREACH OF ASSIJRANCE OF RESULT.
The gist of appc!llant 's complaint

is that they coo-

ceived and gave birth to appellant Michael Payne "relying u~·
the advice and assurance of rlefendants Gcirth G. Myers and Jose·
P. Kesler that a second c~ild could be horn without fear of
defect or impairment."
Ann.

~78-14-6

(Plaintiffs' Complaint, ~15.)

( 1976) exprrossly provides:

No liability shall be imposerl upon any health
care provider on the basis of an alleqed
breach of quarantee, warrdnty, contract or
assurance of result to he obtained from anv
health care cend~ren 1nle>ss the guarantP~~,
warrant'!, co11tract or assur3nc2 as s~t For~~
in writing and siqned by the health care
provirler or an authorized aoent of the
provicler.
1
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~

There is no written document signed by respondent which
,,,

th0

",,~

"

appellants that a second child could be born without

,r defect or impairment.

Indeed, neither John Payne nor

5'"nhanin Payne could place a specific date for the visit during
wh1ch thPy allegedly received the oral assurances.
AcnPLlant at

(Brief of

14.)

Although not raised by the parties at the hearing for
iudqrnent, the statute is dispositive of appellant's

su~rnar;

cl 31,ns

and its application is supported by the record before this
Although the appellants may not raise such a contention

co~r•.

for the first

time on appeal, the respondent may urge any point

reflectPd hy the record in support of its judgment in the
appellate process.
Ill.App.3d 214,

Soencer v. Communitv Hospital of Evanston, 87

408 NE 2d 981, 985 (1980).

Theater Co.,

Favor~tP

See also Fuller v.

230 P.2d 335 (Utah 1951)

(ordinarily

respondent may urge any matter appearing in record in support of
judgrnPnt appealed from); Adams v. Liedholt, 38 Colo.App. 463, 536
P.2d Vi,

aff'd 579 P.2d 618 (1976).
It is clearly reflected in the record that the appel-

la111; rPceived only oral assurances.
Tr-.

at

p.13,

l.

12.)

Appellants have produced no written

,j,, ·urnents signed by respondents.

' ,' i:
c'"
'i

J

lrll''"

ic1nd

ti""

1t

hy

of

(Brief for appellant at 14;

The statute is clear that the

any heal th care provider for any breach of an

of result

is contingent upon a writing so stating and

thP he,;lth care provider.

The legal consequences of

-;t -it ,1t1' Pxrressly support and affirm the trial court's
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qrantina of the summary judarc,nt a.> to re:;"•1nd•'nt·; K··~L·
Myers.

POINT

IV

APPELLANTS' ALLFGATIONS ,\RE
RECORD BEFQRE THE COURT.

NOT

SU?PURTCD BY THE

It is tlw responsihilitv of the appell onts c.n f,Jrc,
this Supreme Court wit'1 the :ir•'cise recorrl consiclered r'':' t::e
trial court

in orrler for

the Surr~11e ·~nurt to :nooerl-_: re":'

error directerl to grantina a motion for summary juda11ent.
Jacobsen v.

State, 89 Wash.?d 104,

569 P.2rl 1152,

1157.

The burden on the party alleqinq error is to show it
tively in the recorr1,

119--

affir~o-

an:l t'ie a;1sence of s1ich an affir:not'.'i·'

record to support the apoell3nt 's contention wi 11 result in'. reviewing court's refusal to consir1er thP cilleqed errnr.
v. Walker,
Schranz
1378,

139 Ga.App.

1. I.

1

L.

145,

Grossman,

1383 (1980)

227 SE.2d q20,
Inc.,

921

(1976).

90 Ill.App.3d 507,

(where record is lacking,

412

'''''
S0 0 :

'lE,::

reviewing court,;

indulge every presumption favorable to judgment or order appe•
from);

Cook v. Hahn,

403 NC.2rl 834, 1337

(Ind.Ap;:i.

error is alleqed but not disclosed by the recorcl,

1980)

such ecrut

not proper subject for revi»w by the court); Coooer
610 Si•l.2d 825,

828

(Tex.Ci'J.l'\pp.

insufficient record, every
indulged in favor of
orderecl unles.'3

1980\

rPason~b1~

ruli~~

helow,

v._~":,':".:.·

(If .'lf1[1ellant hrin1•
nc0su~0ti0n

will

and a reversal will ,nr

it appears that: on no pnssihl1: c;tate of

could the ruling he uphelrl).
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(·•~e'

t:""

,·J.-

It

is respondent's firm contention that the record

nre I h•; aprwllants on appeal is insufficient to support a
,...

,,f lhe trial court's summary judgment.

. .c.11

The record

of all memorandum filed in support or in opposition of

1nn·1~ts

lne rnntion for summary judgment,

the appellants' complaint and the

responrlent's answers and amended answers, and the deposition of
rr.

R.

KPnt Gibbs and attached exhibits.
rrucial to appellants claimed basis for reversal of the

surnmarv judgment are the allegations that appellants incurred
immediate money damages as a result of the removal of Mrs.
Payne's IUD at the February,

1978 office visit.

Equally vital to

appellants claim is the assertion that the IUD was removed for
the express purpose of having a child.

Yet neither of these

Jssertions have a concrete basis in the record before the court.
Dr

Gibbs'

financial statement shows no direct line-charge

t~e

cernoval of the IUD.

(See Gibbs Depo, Exhibit "A").

for

Appel-

!ants merely assert-and provide no substantiation in the recordthat the IUD removal was included in the eventual, general
pteondncy hill set down on January 28, 1979.
A0 ain, appellants assert-but provide no substantiation
in tl1c rc'cord-that Mrs. Payne sought to have her IUD removed
·tr·, ' "

,. t
1

1

c0

,

lir··~"t

11•'"

the [)urpose of conceiving a child.

Yet the only record

enurt relating to Mrs. Payne's state of mind at this

the t1el)0sition of her gynecolo')ist, Dr. Gibbs, reveals no
'tatr•mPnts to this effect.
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(See Gibbs Depa., pp. 20-21).

It

r0snnndent

is

1

s

rJ0;:11-1(J:1.

1:J:)r'1l3nt,-

t-hd~

JI I;_

to support

cldi;n ,'3s

their

orcler granting summarv
is that

t()

tl;e

r~'Jf":-.--;al

ju<lqmerir_.

The

thP

1t-

~rux

of

~t 1 .3 ;_

aooell~nt

dl

they suffered iniurc' prior to t 1P <'fC"°'Cti'JC. onactJl'C'
1

§63-30-4.
assertion

Ap;iellants provide no dir<"ct

<0videnc<" 0f this b 0 ,

in the recorcl of appeal.

failed

to suhstantiate thP basis of t'1eir clai'lls,

shoulcl

indulge every nresumotion favorahle

trial court.
Bowser,

,~,):

Sc~ranz

supra.

I.L.

1;.

Grossman,

this .-0ur

to the judoment

Inc.,

supra;

C000P:

The trial cour:: 's order oranting surimary

as to respondents Kesler and

i~evers

_

l"''

should be reaffir'!led.

POINT V
PUBLIC POLICY IN U~AH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE
LIFE OR WRO'l<~Fl 1 L cir;nH C.\USE OF 'ICTION.
It

is the expr<0ss puhl ic pol icy of the State of Utah n·"

recognize any cause of action for wrongful
birth.

WRONGF~t

life or wrongful

Ut3h Code Annotat<0cl 1)78-11-23 ( 1983), states:

legislature finrls

and declarf>s
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Respondents arque that the appellants' claim for
"wrongful life" and "wrongful hirth" should be rejecterl for
following reasons.

First,

such claims cleal'."ly contravine ''•

pro-life public policy of Utah.

These claims are cleal'."lJ

enigma in the law better lc,ft to the state legislatures.
damages for such clai;ns can only be made on a
basis.

Buhrman v. Allen,

80 N.J.

421,

Sec

highly-s!'e~ull'.

404 A.2d 8 (1979).

Finally, defendant submits that an infant has no legally cogr:
able right to be born without birth defects.
supra at 812.

Becker v. Schwar·.

As a result of these complex and essentially

metaphysical problems, most courts have rejected entil'."ely
claim for wrongful life.

a~

Respondents urge that the complexit,

the issues involved mandate a rejection of the claim for wror.c
life and wrongful birth.

CONCLUSION

ThP trial court's summary judgmerit clismissing appellants' claims against the respondents Myers ancl Kesler should:
affirmecl.

Appellants claim that their cause of action arose

prior to the date on which §63-30-4 became effective is wit~oc:
merit.

The appellants si'11ply did not have a legally coqnizat>

claim until that point in time in which Mrs. Payne became
pregnant.

Mrs. Payne did not become iJl'."Pqnant until well aftec

§63-30-4 became effecti-;e and as sucl-t, ariy claims aoain;t
respondents in their personal caracity al'."e barrecl by the

-22-

1 1
· -

0 taL

Th1s is not a case of a retroactive application of a
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The appellants had no

1ctic)n prior to Mrs. Payne's becoming pregnant.

prior to this point would have been premature.

Any

All the

P]emcnts necessary for a negligence action must co-exist before
that action is cognizable at law.

Duty, breach of duty, a causal

rplationship, and injury must all exist before a negligence cause
of action can arise.

Nominal damages will not suffice.

Further, appellants' claim is phrased in the terminology of assurance of result.

Utah Code Ann. S78-14-6 clearly

states that no liability shall be imposed upon any health care
provider on the basis of a breach of an assurance of result
unless such assurance is in a writing signed by the health care
provider. No such writing was alleged or produced by the appellants in this case. The statute thus stands as an additional and
,Ji,~positive

bar to appellants claims.

Additionally, appellants have not provided a sufficient
record to substantiate their claims of error in the court below.
Lastlv, and perhaps most importantly, it is clearly the public
~1l1cy

of Utah not to recognize causes of action for wrongful

Ji(µ or wrongful birth.
Respondents also deny the appellants contention that
';h J-111-1
,, 111 1 11"11 ;
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unconstitutional and incorporate by reference the

1J(

;1"1nJn1•ss

the Respondent Kesler as to the constitutionality
of the statute.

In light of all these factors, the
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